Blue Water Brief
Energy, fertilizer and gray-zone tracking centred on Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, the South China Sea and undersea cables. Every figure carries a source type, a check date and, where sources disagree, the disagreement.
Conflict Events: Troop or Ship Movement Sea Event Forces. Dashed arrows show a target named in a report, not a launch point. Triangles: Supply Chains and Threat Groups. Crosses: Cable and Gray-Zone Incidents. Squares: Ports (yellow). White dashes: Illustrative Sea Lanes. Diamonds: Bunkering Hubs.
Drag to move. Use the + and - buttons to zoom (or Ctrl and scroll). Click a marker for details and its source. This map is not a live feed. It plots the data on this page; it has no live ship positions. Sea lanes are hand-drawn and only illustrate typical routes. Colours: blue ocean, tan desert, yellow-green savanna, light green grassland, green forest, dark green tropical forest, grey-green boreal forest, pale tundra, white ice, brown mountains. The land types are hand-drawn approximate zones, not satellite land cover. Country borders appear when the public outline file loads.
Countries
Venezuela after January 2026: full profile
US licences issued in 2026 (OFAC)
| Date | Licence | What it allows | Source |
|---|
Who is operating, and where the money goes
Where sources disagree
What to watch next (and what it would mean)
Panama Canal traffic and ports
Daily slots and transits
| When | Slots or transits per day | Detail | Source |
|---|
Maximum draft for Neopanamax ships (how deep they may load)
| Date | Limit | Status | Source |
|---|
Slot auction prices
| Period | Price | Note | Source |
|---|
Water and El Niño
Who gets slots, and why it matters
Link to the port dispute
Where sources disagree
What to watch next (and what it would mean)
Exposure and buffers, all countries
| Country | Crude via Hormuz | LNG via Hormuz | Fertilizer exposure | Oil reserves | Risk score | Source |
|---|
China’s Hormuz share: customs data (36%) supports the 30–40% range; the “about half” figure could not be confirmed. Risk score: Zero Carbon Analytics (Feb 2026), which multiplies Hormuz share by fossil-import dependence; it was published before the war began and only Japan, Korea and India scores were retrieved. Reserves were being drawn down through 2026.
Nation Comparison
Oligarchs and Assets
Mecca Pact
Network Analysis
Deportations in the EU and US
Antarctica and Polar States
China Purge Count
UN Watch
Texas Border
Critical Infrastructure
Farming and Fertilizer
Blocs and Alliances
Supply Chain
▲ mine or district · ● export port or processing site · ■ main buyer region. Solid line: mine to port. Dashed line: port to buyer. Hover a symbol for its name.
Chains
| Commodity | Mine or district | Port or corridor | Main buyer | Owners or operators | Key figures | Risks | Basis and score | Source |
|---|
Score rule: 70 if every field is sourced, 55 if figures are sourced but the mine or port pairing is general knowledge, 35 or below if mostly general knowledge; minus 5 where a dataset is a single outlet. My judgment. China’s gallium, germanium, antimony and graphite are processed inside China rather than shipped as mine-to-port chains; see Trade Flows.
What to watch next (and what it would mean)
Dark Fleet & Risk
Why these three indicators
1. Insurance (P&I) lapses
2. Classification-society changes
3. Port state control detentions
Dark-fleet analysis
Enforcement and events
| Date | What happened | Source |
|---|
Vessel risk score
Where sources disagree
What to watch next (and what it would mean)
Ownership Graph
Lines: solid green = official record (sanctions listing, customs, court, inspection); solid blue = reported by press or reference sites; dashed amber = claimed by a government or intelligence service; dotted grey = gap (not found in the sources reviewed).
Red flags found in this case
Build your own
Where sources disagree
What to watch next (and what it would mean)
STS & Bunkering
● STS zone (red: Iran, amber: Russia, blue: both) · ◆ bunkering hub. Positions are approximate and the coastlines are hand-drawn. Hover a symbol for its name.
Known ship-to-ship zones
| Zone | Linked to | Latest figures | Enforcement | Data year and score | Source |
|---|
Bunkering hubs
| Hub | Latest figures | Reading | Source |
|---|
How to read bunker sales as a proxy
Where sources disagree
What to watch next (and what it would mean)
Oil Reserves
| Country | Group | Proved reserves | Emergency or strategic stocks | Sources |
|---|
Where sources disagree
What to watch next (and what it would mean)
Sanctions
| Authority | Program | Target | Status in 2026 | Vessels | Latest action | Sources |
|---|
Where enforcement leaks
Check a ship or company yourself
| Tool | What it offers |
|---|
To check a single ship by IMO number, use the Vessel dossier on the Vessels tab.
Where sources disagree
What to watch next (and what it would mean)
Conflicts with a sea link
Where sources disagree
What to watch
Threat groups to watch
| Group | What it is | Fighters (estimate) | Funding | Threat to ships |
|---|
Other Armed Groups (Profiles)
Groups that matter for security but are not scored for shipping risk. Click one for a brief overview.
Where sources disagree
What to watch
Arctic & Greenland
Where sources disagree
Global Projects and New Weapons
Currencies and Markets
Military Air Watch
Terms and Corrections
Newsletter and Account
Book Reviews
Power Watch
Military Leadership
Drug Boat Strikes
Small-Volume Minerals
How We Detect Anomalies
Route Deviation Index
Port Anomalies
Identity & Links
Dark Vessel Check
Live Ships: Finland
Vessel Timeline
Vessel Identity and Sanctions
Floating Storage
Reports and Digests
My Watchlist
Data Freshness
Commodity view
Vessel view
All classes side by side
| Class | Typical size | Main cargo | Gates |
|---|
Vessel dossier: look up a ship by IMO number
Record a ship and draw its network
Track history
One position per line: 2026-05-01 06:00, latitude, longitude, note (UTC). Red dashed circles are known STS zones.
Cargo Inference
Evidence sources and how much each is trusted
| Evidence | What it tells you | Weight | Main weakness |
|---|
Weights are my judgment, not a statistical calibration. Confidence = 50% coverage (share of total weight present) + 50% agreement (1 minus the spread between estimates; 0.5 if only one source), capped at 95, minus 20 if the estimate exceeds the ship’s capacity.
1. Estimate a cargo
Evidence you have (leave blank if none):
2. What a draft cut costs in cargo (Panama)
The default ship is hypothetical (near the largest size the new locks allow), and 15.24 to 14.94 m is the cut now in force (the limit was raised from 14.63 m to 14.94 m on Sep 28); a further cut to 14.48 m planned for Oct 1 was postponed on Sep 4 with no new date (see Panama tab). Real ships differ; the figure is an order of magnitude, not a manifest.
3. Cargo counts implied by figures on this page
| Flow | Reported figure | Converted | Evidence behind it | Confidence |
|---|
Converted-figure confidence = the source dataset’s score minus 10 for the typical-cargo-size assumption. Cases with no dataset are scored Low (35) because the input is contested. Typical cargo sizes: VLCC 2.0M barrels, Aframax 0.7M barrels, dry-bulk 50–65 kt.
Satellite storage-tank method (not run here)
- Floating-roof tanks. The roof sits on the oil, so the gap between roof and rim, seen from the shadow inside the tank, gives the fill level. Volume = π/4 × diameter² × height × fill fraction.
- Limits. Cloud cover, revisit gaps of days, unknown tank heights and several ships loading at once. A draw-down cannot be tied to one ship without port timing.
- How to use it here. Enter the draw-down and farm capacity above; it counts as one piece of evidence with the lowest-but-one weight.
What If This Chokepoint Closed?
Chokepoints
Strait of Hormuz Contested
- Prewar about 20 mb/d of crude and products (IEA: nearly 15 mb/d crude alone in 2025); about a quarter of seaborne oil and 19% of LNG in 2025 (CRS).
- US-Israel strikes on Iran Feb 28; ceasefire Apr 8; US blockade of Iranian ports reinstated Jul 13–14.
- Non-Iranian oil moves under US escort and dark ship-to-ship shuttles off Oman (about 150 ships waiting in August versus about 40 in January).
Bab el-Mandeb Escalating
- Oct 4–5: Yemen’s Saudi-backed government began an offensive to retake the Red Sea coast and Sanaa and claims Mocha and Dhubab. Al Jazeera could not verify this, and the Houthis deny the Dhubab claim.
- Houthis took Mokha, Perim Island and Yemen’s Red Sea coast around Sep 10–11.
- Saudi Yanbu exports through the strait hit 3.5 mb/d in June (Kpler); the East-West pipeline was shut after strikes on Sep 11.
- Houthi embargo on Saudi-linked shipping declared in July.
Where sources disagree
What to watch next (and what it would mean)
Event timeline
Trade Flows
China export-control clock (drone and battery inputs)
| Measure | What it covers | Status | Ends | Source |
|---|
Drone motors need rare-earth magnets, batteries need lithium, graphite and cobalt, and chips need gallium and germanium. Sources differ by a day on the November dates.
Where sources disagree
What to watch next (and what it would mean)
Grain flows, 2026
Where sources disagree
What to watch next (and what it would mean)
Cable and gray-zone log
| Date | Where | What was reported | Attribution status | Source |
|---|
What to watch next (and what it would mean)
Route and transit-time estimator
Common routing and rerouting options
| Option | What it does | Capacity or cost | Status now | Source |
|---|
Data and Credits
1. Live feeds (not available on this hosted page)
The page was built to read these feeds, but a hosted page cannot reach other websites, so none of them load. They are listed for reference only. Use the original source for current values.
| Source | Used for | Freshness | Terms status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fintraffic / digitraffic.fi | Live ship positions in Finnish waters (tab removed) | Not loaded here. | CC 4.0 BY, commercial use allowed. Source: Fintraffic / digitraffic.fi, license CC 4.0 BY. Modified: only the last 30 minutes of reports are shown. |
| IMF PortWatch | Daily ship counts at 28 chokepoints and ports (anomaly map, port anomalies, What If Closed?) | Not loaded here. | Not confirmed. The IMF says some data has special terms and to ask copyright@imf.org. Written permission is being sought before public launch. |
| Open-Meteo | Waves, wind and visibility at the anomaly-map locations | Not loaded here. | Free for non-commercial use with credit (CC BY 4.0). Weather data by Open-Meteo.com. |
| US EIA | Oil prices | Not loaded here. | Terms not yet checked by the page owner. |
| USGS | Earthquakes of magnitude 4.5 and above | Not loaded here. | Terms not yet checked by the page owner. |
| NSIDC | Sea ice index (Arctic) | Not loaded here. | Terms not yet checked by the page owner. |
| ExchangeRate-API (open access) | Currency rates on the Currencies and Markets tab | Not loaded here. | Free open-access tier. Terms not yet checked by the page owner. |
| GDELT | News headlines used as leads | Not loaded here. | Terms not yet checked by the page owner. |
| OpenSky Network | Aircraft positions on the Military Air Watch tab | Not loaded here. | Terms not yet checked by the page owner. |
| Natural Earth country outlines (world-atlas package) | Country borders on the map | Loaded from public content networks; a simple continent map is shown if they fail. | Terms not yet checked by the page owner. |
“Terms not yet checked” means the page owner has not yet read that provider’s terms for a public, free site. It does not mean the terms forbid it. This table will be updated as each is checked.
Privacy
This page has no analytics and no advertising, and it does not need an account. The Report an Issue form and Book Reviews submissions are saved to this page’s shared store and read by its editor; nothing else you do on it is sent to its owner. The newsletter sign-up opens an outside email service, which then holds your address under its own terms. An optional sync copies your settings into your Claude account (invited members only) and can be deleted from the Newsletter and Account tab. It saves a few things only in your own browser, on your own device: your watchlist, your pinned areas, what you had seen at your last visit (to show what is new), whether you have finished the tour, display settings, and any records you paste into the Vessel Timeline, Identity and Links or Dark Vessel Check tools. If a feature that needs a personal access token is added later, a token you paste stays only in your browser as well. Clearing this site’s data in your browser erases all of it. When you open a tab, your browser contacts the data providers listed above (for example IMF PortWatch, Open-Meteo and Digitraffic) directly, and they can see your IP address as any website you visit can; this page does not control their records.
How items are checked
Each written item links to the page it came from, and the page was opened and read before the item was added. Many items rest on a single outlet. The confidence label (High, Medium or Low) shows how well an item is supported: more than one independent source raises it, a single outlet or a claim by a party to a conflict keeps it low. This page does not independently verify items beyond the cited source, older items are not re-checked every day, and “last checked for updates” shows when the daily refresh last looked for news. If you find a mistake, use Report a problem.
How ships and companies are named
A ship or company is described as “listed by” a named list on a stated date, and the list is named. This page does not call any ship or company a sanctions evader, smuggler or criminal. Indicators such as AIS gaps, ship-to-ship meetings or name changes show where to look; they do not establish intent or wrongdoing. Where a source makes an allegation, the item names the source and its confidence is shown.
2. Written snapshots
The Situation Report timeline, conflicts, cables, sanctions rows, supply chains, reserves, leadership, and similar tabs are dated notes written from linked news and official pages. Each row names its source and links to it. Claims by a party to a conflict are marked Low confidence. Nothing is added without a page that was opened and read. “Last checked for updates” is the date the daily refresh last looked for new items; it does not mean every older item was re-verified that day. Each item shows its own date. The page is refreshed by a daily routine, and the “Prepared” date on the Situation Report shows when.
3. Data you supply
The Vessel Timeline, Identity and Links, and Dark Vessel Check tools work only on records you paste in. Their examples are invented and labelled as such. Anything you paste stays in your browser on your device.
4. What this page does not use
- Live ship tracking (AIS) is only for Finnish waters. Elsewhere, ship-level questions cannot be answered from this page’s own data.
- No Global Fishing Watch, AISStream or BarentsWatch (Norway) data. BarentsWatch needs a private login that cannot sit in a public page. If any is added, it will be listed above with its licence wording.
- No paid or private data. No satellite imagery has been analysed here.
5. How to read the indicators
- Indicator, not proof. Anomaly colours, dark-activity scores, ship-to-ship meeting flags and infrastructure-proximity flags show where to look. They do not establish intent, illegal activity or wrongdoing. Gaps and unusual traffic have ordinary causes such as weather, reception, holidays and maintenance.
- Weights and thresholds are the page owner’s judgment, not a statistical model. They are shown beside each result.
- Estimates are labelled. Detour distances come from waypoint calculations accurate to a few percent. Closure scale figures are illustrative upper bounds, not forecasts.
- Confidence labels (High, Medium, Low) describe the source and method, not the chance that something is true.
6. Errors and corrections
If you see a wrong or outdated item, use the page’s corrections feature, or tell the page owner. Wrong items will be fixed or removed and the change noted.
7. No affiliation
This page is independent. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by any organisation named here. Names and links are for attribution only.
Glossary
Methods and limits
- Claims versus measurements. Government statements are tagged Official but are political claims when they concern a live conflict. Trackers measure what they can see, and their figures are often revised upward as more ships are observed.
- AIS gaps and dark fleets. Ships can switch off transponders. Analysts infer activity from signal gaps, satellite radar and imagery, and ship-to-ship transfer patterns. Absence of a signal is not absence of a ship.
- Relabeling. Iranian and Venezuelan crude is often declared as Malaysian or Brazilian at customs, so official import tables understate sanctioned flows. Striped bars mark these estimates.
- Stockpiles. China does not publish a full breakdown of strategic and commercial crude stocks, so figures are analyst estimates from import, refinery-run and storage-tank data.
- Cable incidents. Anchor drag can be accident or tactic. Findings often take months and depend on flag-state cooperation.
- Dark fleet and risk. Fleet counts depend on definition (all shadow tankers, sanctioned vessels, EU-listed vessels, core Russian fleet), so they are shown side by side, not merged. Some sources are older than 2026 and are labeled (Atlantic Council 2025, Estonia Apr 2025, the 2024 class-switch example). The risk score weights are my judgment, not a statistical model; there is no public count of uninsured ships. Paris and Tokyo MoU figures count detentions differently, so compare trends, not levels.
- Supply chains. Figures are from the linked articles. Mine coordinates and many port pairings are general knowledge and are marked so; owners are named only where a source gave them. The map uses hand-drawn coastlines and straight lines, so it shows links, not shipping lanes. Data on Simandou, Guinea, Indonesia and Argentina are single-outlet.
- Confidence scores. Each dataset shows a score out of 100: High 80, Medium 60, Low 35, plus 10 if cross-checked, minus 15 if not re-checked in 30 days, minus 5 if some bars are estimates. It is my judgment, not a statistical probability. Cargo-inference scores use the separate rule on the Cargo Inference tab.
- Cargo Inference. The calculator turns evidence you enter into a tonnage estimate. Presets and worked cases are illustrative or converted from figures already on this page. No satellite imagery, AIS or customs records were analysed, and typical ship sizes are general industry knowledge, not sourced here.
- Derived numbers. Where a source gave barrels for a month, I divided by the days in the month to get barrels a day. Those bars are striped.
- Year labels. Where 2026 data was not found, 2025 data is shown and labeled with its year. North Korea and Russia figures rest largely on intelligence-agency claims and commercial trade blogs.
- Why “relabeled”? China’s customs records more “Malaysian” crude than Malaysia produces. Analysts say much of it is Iranian and Venezuelan oil moved ship-to-ship off Malaysia and declared as Malaysian. It is an inference from mismatched totals, not a cargo-by-cargo finding.
- Port ownership. Stakes come from company profiles, Wikipedia and trade press, and differ by source. Individuals are named only where reporting documents their ownership. Nothing here asserts anyone’s personal politics.
- Verification. Direct UN Comtrade queries were not possible from this environment. Cross-checks used Comtrade-derived pages (OEC, bank trade profiles), China customs reports, SIPRI and IEA. Rows marked “Cross-checked” say what was matched. China’s stockpile cannot be checked against primary data because none is published.
- War materials. SIPRI tracks major weapons only, so drone parts, electronics and small drones are mostly missing from official counts.
- Grain, Venezuela and Panama. Grain data ends Sep 16 and Venezuela data ends July (August and September totals not found). Panama figures are mostly trade-press summaries of Panama Canal Authority notices; the Sep 4 postponement notice and the Sep 28 advisory (A-36-2026) were read directly. USDA’s September wheat figures were not retrieved. Several grain claims rest on one outlet: the “MoLoChKa” operation name, the 172-vessel count and the 5–10 Mt worst case. Several pages had 2026 headlines but older data (one “2026” Venezuela page held 2023 figures); those were discarded.
- Snapshot. This page is not a live feed.
Situation Report
How items are checked: each item links to the page it came from, opened and read before it was added. Many rest on a single outlet, so every item carries a confidence label, and claims by a party to a conflict are always Low. Items are not independently verified, and older items are not re-checked daily.
Status by area
| Area | Status | What is happening | Source |
|---|
Changed in the last 7 days
Dates coming up
| Date | Time left | What happens | Why it matters |
|---|
What to watch next (and what it would mean)
This page does not update itself. For a daily briefing, ask Claude each morning to “update the situation report”; it will re-check the headlines and rewrite this tab. The check-date badge above turns red when the report is over 30 days old.
Undersea cables
What is happening
How to read a cable cut
Incident log (newest first)
| Date | Where | Cable(s) | Cut? | Effect | Cause and attribution | Source |
|---|
What to watch next (and what it would mean)
Port ownership
Largest container ports, 2025
| Port | Million TEU | Operator and owner | Nationality | Individual owner | Source |
|---|
Largest terminal operators, 2025 (DynaLiners)
| # | Operator | Million TEU | Owner | Country | Individual owner | Documented government or regulatory context | Source |
|---|
Contested port concessions
| Port | Holder | What happened | Source |
|---|
Operators ranked 8–10 (ICTSI, Yilport, CMA CGM) are not profiled. Ownership shares differ between sources (for example Shanghai’s direct state stake is about 44% or 61% depending on how affiliates are counted). Names link to Wikipedia; check them against company filings before relying on them.
Panama’s canal traffic, slot cuts and draft limits are on the Panama tab. The ports there (Balboa and Cristobal) sit at the two ends of the canal.